Considerable progress has been made in the research on how intuitions and emotions affect decision making within the framework of Judgment and Decision Making (JDM).
Intuition and decision making
There is no single agreed upon definition of intuition (Parikh, Neubauer, & Lank (1994) . In this study we regard a decision as guided by intuition if the decision maker ascribes it to a "vague feeling of knowing something without knowing exactly how or why" (Hayashi, 2001, p. 60) .
There is ample anecdotal evidence regarding the ubiquity and importance of intuition in managerial decision making (Hayashi, 2001; Isenberg, 1984) . This evidence is supported by more systematic findings from surveys (Parikh et al., 1994; .
For example, Parikh et al. (1994) surveyed an international sample of 1312 business persons. 54% of these reported using intuition in their decisions, ranging between 5 corporate strategy and planning (79.9%) and human resource development (78.6%) to production/operations (27.7%) and finance (31.1%). In another study surveyed the opinions of managers regarding the conditions that are favorable for intuitive decisions. His results (e.g., high levels of uncertainty and little perceived utility or applicability of analysis) were consistent with the conclusions of Shapiro and Spence (1997) and Yaniv and Hogarth (1993) .
The widespread use of intuition by managers indicates that they regard intuition as a valid guide for decision making. In contrast, the literature on intuition in decision making typically views intuition as a source of error (e.g., Bonabeau, 2003; Baron, 1998; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002) . A minority of researchers who tend to have an applied bent view it, in contrast, as a source of strength and the key to understanding managerial and experts' decision making (e.g., Agor, 1986 b; Harper, 1988; Klein, 1998; Parikh et al., 1994) . A third group of researchers suggest that properly used intuitions are indispensable for effective decision making in real world situations (Blattberg & Hoch, 1990; Hogarth, 2001; Myers, 2002; Pondy, 1983) . Myers (2002) provides a comprehensive discussion of the evidence regarding the advantages and disadvantages of intuitive reasoning. The most prominent advantage that is relevant to decision making is efficiency (light requirements of time and attention), which, in the case of expert decision makers, tends to be coupled with accuracy: First moves identified, sometimes within seconds, by highly proficient chess players tend to be satisfactory and sometimes even optimal (Burns, 2004; Calderwood, Klein, & Crandall, 1988; Klein, Wolf, Militello and Zsambok, 1995) . The principal disadvantage of intuitive decision making according to Myers is susceptibility to the judgmental biases such as those 6 studied within the "Judgment and decision making" (JDM) framework (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) .
Emotion and decision making
Intuitions and emotions are often intertwined in real world decision processes. Similar to intuitions, emotions were traditionally considered to have an adverse effect on decision quality (or "rationality"), typically described as 'disruptive', 'illogical', 'biased', and 'weak', (Putnam & Mumby, 1993, p. 36) . The most eloquent advocacy of this position is arguably, Janis and Mann's seminal work on decision making under conflict (1977) which elaborated how stress-induced negative feelings 1 systematically cause deviations from an informal version of the rational choice model.
Several researchers contested the negative view of emotions in judgment and decision making. In his classical book on "Thought and choice in chess, " de Groot (1946 " de Groot ( /1978 referred to a feeling of "promisingness" that guided proficient chess players' exploration of lines of play. Schwarz (1990 Schwarz ( , 2000 proposed the affect-as-information framework which argued that people rely on their feelings (and their intuitions) because they consider them to include valuable information. According to this framework, emotions influence judgment through a controlled inferential process in which people examine their feelings towards the entity (e.g., course of action) under consideration. Taking this notion a step further, Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, and Ritov (1997) proposed a subjective expected pleasure theory. According to this variant of the subjective expected utility model, decision makers under risk compare alternative gambles in terms of their associated expected pleasure and choose the gamble with the largest expected average pleasure.
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The notion that emotions convey valuable information received compelling support from studies by Damasio (1995) showing types of brain damage which impair emotional, but not intellectual, functioning, brought on patently dysfunctional everyday decisions.
Challenging the Cartesian distinction between "rational" and "emotional," Damasio proposed the somatic marker hypothesis: decision making is helped by somatic reactions that provide valid information without which people have difficulty in judging the desirability of the option or options under consideration. Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, and Hughes (2001) documented additional positive effects of emotions on judgment, finding that "compared to non-affective, reason-based evaluative assessment of stimuli, feelings provide judgmental responses that are (a) potentially faster (though possibly subject to further appraisal processes), (b) more consistent across individuals, and importantly (c) more predictive of the number and valence of spontaneous thoughts regarding a target stimuli (pictures).
Two important research programs on emotion and decision making within the JDM framework concern the affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2003; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & McDonald, 2002) and the risk as feelings hypothesis (Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch, 2001 ). According to the affect heuristic, objects, entities, and events trigger positive or negative affective responses which influence judgment, and, being readily available, can serve as a more efficient basis for making decisions than purely cognitive deliberations. The affect heuristic explains a variety of phenomena related to judgment and decision making under risk, such as how judgments about benefits and risks exert a reciprocal influence on one another, and why elicited affect laden imagery is predictive of future decisions.
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The risk as feelings hypothesis (Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch, 2001 ) is basically similar to the somatic marker hypothesis, the affect as information framework, and the affect heuristic. Assuming that feelings are necessarily cognitively mediated, the hypothesis suggests that feelings play a much more prominent role in risk decision making than acknowledged in traditional cognitive-consequentialist JDM research.
Echoing the negative view of the role of emotions in judgment and decision making,
suggests that in addition to providing information that influences judgment and decision making, emotions may produce behavioral responses that are inconsistent with decision makers' preferred course of action.
The models outlined above can be regarded as variants of the dual-process hypothesis which suggests that people's experiential systems integrate automatically cognitive and affective input in motivating behavior (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 20003; Sloman, 1996) .
The present study complements the hypothesis by documenting how loan officers integrate cognitive and emotional input in a non-automatic deliberate fashion in deciding to approve or reject credit applications.
Credit decisions
The study of credit decisions has a long history particularly from a normative financial perspective (see Rodgers & Johnson, 1998 for a review), partly because commercial lending by banks is an appropriate arena for studying decision making since loan officers assess risk systematically, make repeated similar decisions and track the outcomes of these decisions (McNamara and Bromiley, 1997) . Findings from studies of loan officers in controlled experiments using hypothetical scenarios of loan applications showed that (1) the longer the bank's association with the customer, the larger the 9 requested loan, and the more exciting its associated industry, the more likely are loan officers to underrate loan risks (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997) . (2) The larger the cognitive load (number of applications) of loan officers, the greater the likelihood that bank officers will use non-compensatory decision strategies (Biggs, Bedard, Gaber, & Linsmeier, 1985) . (3) Loan officers reach high levels of confidence early in the lending process and later tend to ignore information that is inconsistent with their early impressions (Danos, Holt, & Imhoff, 1989) . (4) Loan officers fail to weigh properly the credibility of financial information when evaluating commercial loans (Davidson & Wright, 2001) . A survey of bank loan officers showed that the diverse variables which they considered in deciding on small business loan applications fell into one of four factors: The firm's financial soundness (risk), loan cost (cost), loan size (risk), and loan maturity (risk) (Ulrich and Arlow (1981) . Finally, Rodgers (1991) and Rodgers & Johnson (1988) used structural modeling to capture loan officers' processing of financial information.
All the above studies pertain to how loan officers use (often synthetic) quantifiable financial information. Can synthetic tasks and contrived laboratory conditions capture the variables that influence real world credit decisions? Not really, according to Jankowicz and Hirsch (1987, p. 45 ) who claim that "commercial loan decisions involve both specific, quantifiable information and subjective, qualitative judgments. These two classes of information are often summarized as 'the five Cs of commercial lending, i.e.,
Character, Capacity, Capital, Collateral, and Conditions….
[A]n applicant's standingparticularly on the first two 'C's' -is often said to depend largely on the intuitive judgment of the lending officer." This study examined Jankowicz and Hirsch's observation empirically by studying how loan officers make their credit decisions.
Method

Participants
Fourteen (13 males, 1 female) loan officers volunteered to participate in the study.
This sample constituted 30% of the bank's middle market loan officers ($500,000-$5,000,000 credit bracket). Participants had at least 10 years of experience that included managing a field branch or a central office department. Each was responsible for recruiting and providing a full range of credit services to a group of customers. The officers' performance is measured (and rewarded) by the percent of profit in their clients'
portfolios.
Procedure
The 14 loan officers belonged to one of three regional offices whose managers volunteered to participate in the study. Prior to interviewing the second author met with the manager and interviewees in a group setting in order to explain the objectives of the study and the CDM method and to obtain the loan officers' consent to be interviewed.
Interviews lasted between one-two hours. After repeating the purpose of the study, ensuring the confidentiality of his or her information, and obtaining permission to use a tape recorder, the interviewer asked for a brief description of the interviewee's job and past experience in the bank, and followed the procedure outlined in the next section below. If time permitted, or if the first case reported was too thin, the interviewee was asked to provide a second case. Altogether the interviews yielded 23 cases, of which one 11 did not refer to gut feelings. Ten interviewees provided one case, two interviewees provided two cases each, and two interviewees provided four and five cases each.
Data collection
Data were collected by the second author using the Critical Decision Method (CDM), a three-phased semi-structured interview designed to elicit decision makers' expertise from long term memory (Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Klein, Calderwood & MacGregor, 1989 ; see also Fisher & Geiselman, 1992 , for discussion and validation of a similar method). In the first phase of he interview interviewees were asked to report, in their own words, a challenging case of credit decision based on personal experience that involved their gut feelings or "stomach pains" (a term that we have picked up in our initial contacts at the bank.) Next, the interviewer used non-directed probes in order to elaborate the preliminary factual case description, paying particular attention to the chronological order of events, thoughts and feelings, and contextual details (e.g., "Can you elaborate?" "Was there something else?" Basically it had three phases. In the first you….")
Data Analysis
Cases were analyzed using qualitative research methods (Charmaz, 1995 , Kvale, 1996 Weiss, 1994) and the method developed by Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) . Analysis consisted of three phases: 1) Line-by-line coding for identifying types of uncertainty, coping tactics, and types of gut feelings. 2) Refinement of the above by deleting or combining low frequency codes and ensuring the convergent and divergent validity of code categories. 3) Constructing an individual case decision process model and an overall loan decision process model. Cohen's Kappa coefficients of inter-rater agreement (Cohen, 1960) between the second author and a second independent analyst were satisfactory ( = .73 for types of uncertainty and coping tactics and = .77 for gut feelings.)
Results
Proper understanding of how loan officers' intuitions and emotions influence their decisions requires an appreciation of the context in which these decisions are made.
Consequently, this section reports on the loan officer's task, generic clients, generic decisions and decision process, uncertainties, coping tactics and their intuitions and emotions as reported in the interview protocols.
The nature and context of loan officers' credit decisions Clients: Loan officers deal with three types of clients who present somewhat different decision problems and associated uncertainties. Sixteen cases concerned new clients, namely clients with whom the officer or the regional office had no previous experience and about whom there is the least amount of existing information. Five cases involved current clients with whom the loan officer had prior experience. Two cases involved transferred clients who were previously dealt with by one of the bank's other loan officers.
Generic decisions: Loan officers are required to make three types of generic decisions: Twenty-two cases involved approving or denying new credit applications (by any one of the three types of client); 12 cases involved extending or terminating an existing transaction (by a current or transferred client); and one case involved the decision whether or not to prosecute a current delinquent client.
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The decision to approve or deny credit involves two types of potential error: Uncertainty: Uncertainty is a central aspect of credit granting decisions. Although loan officers' generic decisions can be presented as choice problems (e.g., approve or deny), these are more accurately construed as matching problems (Lipshitz, 1994) :
Approve an application if it is financially sound and the applicant is personally trustworthy. Otherwise reject it. The basic type of uncertainty encountered by loan officers is, accordingly, inadequate understanding of the current situation rather than ignorance regarding the nature, probability, or utility of future outcomes (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) . This uncertainty was manifested as doubts regarding the financial soundness of the transaction or as doubts regarding the personal credibility of the client.
Doubts regarding the soundness of the transaction arose from analysis of the financial data. Doubts regarding the credibility of the client arise from impressions generated by 14 his or her behavior. These differences are elaborated in the discussion of the loan officer's decision process below.
Coping tactics: Consistent with Lipshitz & Straus (1997) , loan officers used five tactics to cope with uncertainty: Reduction (e.g., active information search, 61.3%), assumption-based reasoning (i.e., using assumptions to compensate for unavailable information, 22.6%), forestalling (e.g., preparing a course of action for a worst case scenario 14%), weighing pros and cons (as in a multi-attribute analysis, 1.1%), and suppression (e.g., ignoring potential risks, 1.1%).
Generic decision process
All 22 cases analyzed in this study began with uncertainty regarding the soundness of the transaction triggered by a credit application. These doubts were followed by 4 discernible phases: Collecting and analyzing financial information; collecting and Post-approval monitoring. Approving a loan application did not resolve doubts regarding its advisability. Loan officers coped with this residual uncertainty by monitoring the client's behavior (e.g., transactions in his or her account and impressions of his behavior during visits to the bank). The intensity of monitoring was determined by the intensity of negative gut feelings experienced prior to approving the credit.
The nature, antecedents and consequences of gut feelings
Gut feelings were typically described physical sensations such as "It did not smell right" or "My stomach was all in knots." In 5 of the 22 cases that involved gut feelings the latter were compatible with a positive decision regarding the credit application (positive gut feelings). In 14 cases they were incompatible with approval (negative gut feelings). Two cases referred to positive feelings that changed into and negative feelings.
Gut feelings were typically aroused following face-to-face meetings with the client.
Although loan officers could report, upon reflection, on what triggered their gut feelings in 20 of the 22 cases, they all regarded them as not amenable to factual explanation (e.g.,
"It was purely a gut feeling, there was nothing I could point to as a red light"). Careful reading of the transcripts pointed to observable triggers (antecedents) of both negative and positive gut feelings. These could be classified into three basic types of client behavior which could be further classified into more specific sub-categories (Table 1. ) Table 1 here --------------------------------- Table 1 presents the definitions of the triggers of loan officers' gut feelings accompanied by illustrative quotations. Although loan officers did not have objective evidence regarding the validity of these cues and their associated gut feelings, they put more trust in these feeling, in particular their negative gut feelings, than in conflicting financial information. The following assertion, by one of the loan officers, is representative: "I have a very clear rule: I would not approve a loan, no matter how good is the financial information, if have negative vibes about it." Final decisions to approve or deny credit in the 14 cases that involved negative gut feelings were evenly split: seven applications were rejected and seven were approved. However, according to our interviewees later information showed that in 5 of the 7 cases in which credit was denied the client was unreliable (consistent with the negative gut feelings), whereas in 6 of the cases in which credit was approved despite the negative gut feelings the bank experienced complications as a result of the decision to approve. There was as yet insufficient data to evaluate the remaining decision. Since the sample of decisions is not representative the interviewees' judgments should be taken as evidence regarding loan officers' trust in the validity of positive and negative gut feelings, rather than as evidence regarding their actual validity.
Why was credit approved in seven cases in spite of the loan officers' negative gut feelings? Examination of these cases reveals three possible causes for the overruling of negative gut feelings: Prior experience with the client possibly leading to escalation of commitment (Staw, Barsade, & Koput, 1997) , competition between clearly positive financial information and ambiguous gut feelings, and institutional pressures to enlist new clients during downturns in the bank's business. Credit was approved in all 5 cases that involved positive gut feelings (which were compatible with positive financial information). In three of these cases the decision to approve was judged, in retrospect, to have been an error. Consequently, positive gut feelings were regarded as less reliable than negative gut feelings, owing to their susceptibility to attenuating influences associated with personal relationships with the client (e.g., "I was blinded by the client's personality and thus trusted too much in his collateral;" "Overall he was a good person, according to my impressions, and that was not the time to put pressure on him.")
Discussion
Ample anecdotal evidence suggests that intuitions and emotions are cherished by proficient decision makers and play a significant role in their real-world decisions. For example, the legendary investor George Soros wrote that "As a fund manager, I depend a great deal on my emotions…. The predominant feelings I operate with are doubt, uncertainty, and fear. I had moments of hope or even euphoria, but they made me feel insecure. By contrast worrying made me feel safe" (Soros, 1998, p. 24) .
Researchers have acknowledged the role of intuitions and emotions in managerial decision making for quite some time (Simon, 1987) . Nevertheless, the systematic investigation of these factors came into its own relatively recently, partly owing to reservations about their suitability for rigorous research (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995) .
As a result, "managerial research has yet to provide direct empirical evidence for intuition, or articulate how it can best be used" (Shapiro & Spence, 1997, p. 63) , and "much of the research on intuitive decision making is conceptual, and little quantitative or qualitative research has been done in field settings to support…[the claim] that intuition plays an increasingly significant role in contemporary strategic strategies" (Burke & Miller, 1999, p. 91) .
Although our findings did not allow us to peek into the black box in which automatic intuitive processes take place, the present study provides direct evidence on how intuitions guide the decision processes of bank loan officers, and the observable cues which may systematically trigger them. These findings begin to close the gap noted by Shapiro and Spence (1997) and Miller and Burke (1999) above, and make two additional contributions. They help to dispel the quantitative financial bias that dominates the descriptive and prescriptive research of loan officers' decision making, and they support and elaborate extant notions of the role of intuitions and emotions in real world decision making.
Dispelling the quantitative financial bias in credit decisions practice and research Approving or denying a credit application is usually conceived as a purely financial decision that can (and should) be determined solely on the basis of "hard" quantitative information. This bias is reflected by the use of financial or otherwise quantifiable variables (e.g., loan size and cash flow forecasts) in research on commercial lending (Biggs et al., 1985; Deakins, & Hussain, 1991; Fletcher, 1995; McNamara & Bromiley, 1997; Ulrich & Arlow, 1981) . The exclusion of non-financial factors in this research produces conclusions such as "the focal point of a loan officer's evaluation of a small business loan proposal is the expected return and risk of the loan" (Ulrich & Arlow, 1981, p. 55) , which, according to our findings, should be treated with care.
Appreciating the role of intangible factors, such as intuitions and emotions is also handicapped by the use of synthetic tasks even if loan officers are used as subjects (e.g., Biggs et al., 1985) . The quantitative financial bias is also reflected in bank loan officers' official practice. According to McNamara & Bromiley (1997, p. 334 ) "The bank's loan review manual indicated that the major factors that lending officers should base their risk evaluations on included a borrower's firm management capabilities, market position, financial health, (cash flow, financeable assets, net income, liquidity, leverage and size, for instance), collateral, and sources of loan repayment." The use of credit scoring systems which rely exclusively on financial information is also widespread (Meyer, 1995/6; Wendel & Harvey, 2003) . Finally, the bias is built into decision support systems 20 which are geared to handle only financial information (e.g., Ding & Yeo, 1996) and into advice to managers of small businesses on how to obtain bank loans successfully Justis (1982) .
Underlying the quantitative financial bias is a conceptualization of credit granting as a financial transaction between institutions or economic players. While this conceptualization is valid, it is incomplete. Credit granting can also be construed as an interpersonal interaction between a loan officer and a client that is rooted in their history and embedded in their subjective perceptions and feelings. In fact, another legendary investor, Warren Buffet, is said to base his acquisition decisions largely on his perception of the personality of the business owner with whom he intends to maintain a long-term collaboration (Lowenstein, 1996) . In conclusion, our findings show that loan officers' decision processes are consistent with previous studies within the NDM framework which showed that experienced practitioners in a variety of professions use experiencebased intuitions to extract and interpret relevant cues from a complex perceptual field (Klein, 2002) and use story construction to cope with uncertainty (Cohen, Freeman & Wolf, 1996) . Different from the naval officers studied by Cohen et al., loan officers evaluated their clients' stories, rather than their own.
Emotion in loan officers' decision making
As noted in the Introduction, growing interest in emotions and decision making produced several models within the JDM framework. As these models were mostly studied in laboratory experiments using concurrent choice tasks, it is interesting to examine their compatibility with our findings:
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The strong impact of loan officers' gut feelings is consistent with the basic tenet of affect heuristic to the effect that "images marked by positive and negative feelings guide judgment and decision making" (Slovic et al., 2002, p. 400 ) and the affect-as-information proposition which show that "people often form overall evaluations based on their momentary feelings toward the target and appear to do so in an informed, deliberate manner (Pham et al., 2001, p. 168) .
The stronger influence of negative gut feelings relative to positive financial information is consistent with the findings of affect heuristic research that people who like an activity (or a course of action) judge the associated risks as low, and vice versa (Slovic et al., 2002) .
The influence of emotions is also consistent with the evaluability principle which suggests that "the weight of a stimulus attribute in an evaluative judgment or choice is proportional to the ease or precision with which the value of that attribute…can be mapped into an affective impression" (Slovic et al., 2002, p. 406) . The relative dominance of negative gut feelings can also be explained by findings that affect richness yields pronounced loss aversion (Rottenstreich & Shu, in press ).
In conclusion, the models of emotions and decision making developed within the JDM framework seem compatible with our findings. This finding is interesting, because these models assume that emotions influence various aspects of a process of assessing, weighing, and combining likelihoods and utilities (Rottenstreich & Shu, in press), whereas he loan officers that we studied used a process of serial option generation and evaluation consistent with the RPD model (Klein 1998) . Thus, rather than validating the above models, our findings elaborate the RPD model by showing how negative and positive emotions, triggered by certain critical cues that are anchored in person or story schemas schema (Lipshitz & Ben Shaul, 1997) , influence the information search and option selection process. An important aspect of this distinction is that in our findings intuitions and emotions are do not register automatically as posited by the dual-process proposition (Sloman, 1996) 
Transferred credibility
Transferring to the client credibility attributed to professionals (e.g., accountants) who accompany him.
"I know this accountant. We gave him many clients and he brought many clients to us".
